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AbsTrACT
background In 2011, England introduced the Public 
Health Responsibility Deal (RD), a public-private 
partnership (PPP) which gave greater freedom to the 
food industry to set and monitor targets for salt intakes. 
We estimated the impact of the RD on trends in salt 
intake and associated changes in cardiovascular disease 
(CVD) and gastric cancer (GCa) incidence, mortality and 
economic costs in England from 2011–2025.
Methods We used interrupted time series models 
with 24 hours’ urine sample data and the IMPACTNCD 
microsimulation model to estimate impacts of changes in 
salt consumption on CVD and GCa incidence, mortality 
and economic impacts, as well as equity impacts.
results Between 2003 and 2010 mean salt intake was 
falling annually by 0.20 grams/day among men and 0.12 
g/d among women (P-value for trend both < 0.001). 
After RD implementation in 2011, annual declines in 
salt intake slowed statistically significantly to 0.11 g/d 
among men and 0.07 g/d among women (P-values for 
differences in trend both P < 0.001). We estimated that 
the RD has been responsible for approximately 9900 
(interquartile quartile range (IQR): 6700 to 13,000) 
additional cases of CVD and 1500 (IQR: 510 to 2300) 
additional cases of GCa between 2011 and 2018. If 
the RD continues unchanged between 2019 and 2025, 
approximately 26 000 (IQR: 20 000 to 31,000) additional 
cases of CVD and 3800 (IQR: 2200 to 5300) cases of 
GCa may occur.
Interpretation Public-private partnerships such as the 
RD which lack robust and independent target setting, 
monitoring and enforcement are unlikely to produce 
optimal health gains.
InTroduCTIon
Public-private partnerships (PPPs), involving 
public and private sector organisations establishing 
collective initiatives to improve health have been 
promoted as a key mechanism to address non-com-
municable diseases.1 They have been presented as a 
promising middle option between industry self-reg-
ulation, which is argued to lack sufficient oversight, 
and legislative and regulatory approaches, which 
can be powerful but politically contentious.2 PPPs 
have especially been promoted as a mechanism 
to meet nutritional targets to reduce population 
intakes of sugar, fat and salt set by national govern-
ments and the WHO.3 Despite their popularity, 
PPPs remain poorly evaluated and evidence on how 
best to engage the private sector to improve public 
health nutrition is lacking.2
The Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD), 
a PPP in operation in England from 2011–2017, 
aimed to engage government, the voluntary sector 
and the commercial sector to work in partnership 
to improve population health.4 Prior to the RD, 
from 2003 to 2010 the independent Food Stan-
dards Agency (FSA) undertook a multicomponent 
strategy to reduce salt intake, including the use of 
agreements with the food industry to reformulate 
processed foods, increase public awareness and 
introduce food labelling.5 While the FSA strategy 
was arguably a PPP, it differed in important ways 
from the RD (Box 1). Industry had almost no role in 
the formulation of policy and specific strategies to 
reduce population-level salt intake and targets were 
set by the FSA for reductions to be achieved within 
4 years, with mid-point review at 2 years along-
side independent monitoring.6 7 Additionally, while 
agreements with the food industry were technically 
'voluntary', they were backed with the repeated 
ministerial threat of mandatory imposition in the 
event of poor compliance.8 9 While there have been 
evaluations of the process of setting targets and the 
mechanisms of the RD, a lack of available data has 
previously precluded a quantitative evaluation of 
the change from the FSA salt reduction strategy to 
the RD.5 Such evaluations could provide important 
lessons, both internationally and for England which 
is set to soon revise its salt reduction strategy. We 
have therefore estimated the impact of the RD on 
trends in population-level salt intake and associated 
changes in cardiovascular disease (CVD) and gastric 
cancer (GCa) incidence and mortality, and their 
economic costs in England from 2011 to 2025.
MeThods
We used interrupted time series (ITS) analysis to 
estimate the impact of the RD on trends in popu-
lation-level salt intake and microsimulation model-
ling to estimate associated changes in CVD and 
GCa incidence and mortality, and their economic 
costs within a synthetic English population.
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box 1 Key differences between FsA and rd salt 
reduction strategies
Food standards Agency salt reduction strategy 2003–2010
Targets: The FSA strategy involved specific targets for 85 
categories of food (of approximately 10–20% reductions), which 
were developed in 2005. In 2006 the FSA published industry 
salt targets to be achieved by 2010. Meeting these targets was 
subsequently delayed to 2012.
 
Activities: Reformulation of foods known to contain high levels 
of salt, and introduction of food labelling and public awareness 
campaigns (e.g. to reduce salt use when cooking).
 
Monitoring: Monitoring of progress was by the independent 
FSA, alongside the establishment of national monitoring of 
population-level salt intakes to monitor progress. Results of 
progress were publicly available.
 
Involvement: 'Voluntary' involvement and targets were 
underpinned by direct pressure from the FSA, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and Government Ministers threatening 
further regulation.
reduction strategy 2011–2017
Targets: There was an original commitment to the 2012 FSA 
targets for salt, with targets after this set by industry partners 
themselves.
 
Activities: There were a range of food pledges which could be 
signed up to for catering and food production sectors. These 
included chef training in using less salt; providing salt content 
on menus; and reformulation, all within 2 years of signing RD 
pledges.
 
Monitoring: A plenary group of senior representatives from 
the business community, NGOs, public health organisations 
and local government oversaw the RD, with monitoring by 
the Department of Health. Partners were asked to report on 
their progress by the end of April each year. For some pledges, 
partners were asked to report using pre-defined quantitative 
measures, while for others they were asked for a narrative 
update.
 
Involvement: Voluntary
Table 1 Surveys with 24 hours' urinary salt data included
dates of 24 hours' urine 
collection
n 
included 
in 
analyses
National Diet and Nutrition Survey 
2000/1
July 2000 to June 2001 1029
England 2006 sodium survey October 2005 to July 2006 445
UK 2008 sodium survey January to May 2008 571
England 2011 sodium survey July to December 2011 499
England 2014 sodium survey May to September 2014 622
National Diet and Nutrition Survey Rolling Programme (sensitivity analyses only)
2008 January to December 2008 75
2009 January to December 2009 96
2010 January to December 2010 101
2011 January to December 2011 154
2012 January to December 2012 153
2013 January to June 2013 88
data sources
Data for population salt intake come from 24 hours' urine 
samples collected in the National Diet and Nutrition Survey 
(NDNS) 2000/01, and national sodium surveys conducted in 
2006, 2008, 2011 and 2014. All sodium surveys were of adults 
aged 19–64 years and designed to produce nationally represen-
tative estimates of salt intake. The NDNS is a dietary survey of 
children and adults in the UK, and includes an interview, diary 
sample and urine collection (only among adults), and selects 
participants using a multistage random probability design. The 
response rate for the survey overall was 61% and of these 66% 
consented to 24 hours' urine collection.10 The 2006 sodium 
survey was drawn from the nationally representative Health 
Survey for England (HSE) 2005, while the subsequent sodium 
surveys used random samples of postcodes and random digit 
dialling of telephone numbers within these.11 Response rates 
ranged from 43% in 2006 to 61% in 2014 and sample sizes for 
all surveys are provided in table 1 and elsewhere.11
The NDNS and four sodium surveys all adhered to a stan-
dardised protocol with participants asked to collect all urine 
during a 24-hour period. With the exception of the NDNS 
2000/1, all surveys used para-amino benzoic acid (PABA) tablets 
to assess completion of urine collection and we only included 
data where PABA excretion ≥70%.12 In line with official reports, 
we used data from NDNS and the four sodium surveys data 
which were adjusted for changes in the instruments to estimate 
salt intakes over time.
Interrupted time series modelling
We used an ITS analysis which is a quasi-experimental design 
and is appropriate for natural experiments when an intervention 
occurs at a well-defined moment in time.13 For this analysis, we 
identified 2010 as the last year of the FSA strategy followed by 
the introduction of the RD in 2011. Our ITS was a Generalised 
Linear Model and a Gamma distributed-dependent variable to fit 
the positively skewed salt intake data. The model included two 
time-based explanatory variables, an annual time trend between 
2000/1 and 2010 and a post-RD trend from 2011 to 2014. The 
model was also adjusted for age group (19–34, 35–49, and 50–64 
years) and stratified by sex. We used this model to estimate the 
pre-RD trend, and the post-RD trend and report P-values for 
whether the trend post-RD is different to that pre-RD. We did 
not include a term for an immediate step change in intakes as we 
did not expect any changes from the transition to the RD to be 
immediate.
In a sensitivity analysis, we also used 24 hours' urinary salt 
data collected in the NDNS Rolling Programme (2008/9–
2013/4). Here salt intake was assessed from participants with 
PABA excretion ≥70%, consistent with the main analysis. While 
this data did provide estimates for additional years, sample sizes 
were small, ranging from six to 42 participants in each age and 
sex group, and were therefore not included in the main analyses.
IMPACTnCd
We estimated the effect of changes in salt intake on CVD 
and GCa outcomes using the IMPACTNCD model, which has 
been previously used to quantify the effect of salt policies in 
England.14 IMPACTNCD is a microsimulation model which 
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Figure 1 Pre- and post-Responsibility Deal trends of salt intake in 
England 2000/01 to 2014.
generates synthetic individuals to simulate the impacts of 
changing risk factors on disease outcomes and uses probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis to estimate uncertainty of outcomes. Popu-
lation information by age, sex and socioeconomic status comes 
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and additional data 
on risk factors for CVD and GCa from the Health Survey for 
England (HSE). We used effect sizes of the association between 
risk factors and CVD and GCa from published meta-analyses 
and longitudinal studies (online supplementary appendix table 
7). The impact of salt on CVD was mediated through blood pres-
sure with a 5-year median lag time (range 1 to 10 years) and 
effects on GCa were modelled directly with an 8-year median 
lag time (range 1 to 10 years).14 We informed the model with 
the socioeconomic gradient from HSE spot-urine salt data to 
overcome the lack of consistent socioeconomic information in 
the 24-hours' sodium surveys. As the 24-hours' urine data did 
not include adults aged over 64 years we also extrapolated salt 
intakes for older adults based on the HSE data. A more detailed 
description of IMPACTNCD is provided in the online appendix 
supplementary material.
We modelled two scenarios which were informed by the 
findings of the ITS. First, in our counterfactual scenario we 
assumed that the approximately linear decline in salt intake 
that was observed before 2011 continued, as if the RD has 
never been implemented. Second, we modelled a RD scenario 
which assumed that the post-RD trend estimated from our ITS 
continued until 2025. In a separate, one-way sensitivity analysis 
we assumed a logarithmic decline calibrated to reach a popu-
lation mean salt intake of 7.0 g/day (vs 6.5 g/day in the main 
analysis) by 2020, and 6.6 g/day (vs 5.8 g/day) by 2025, for the 
baseline scenario. This assumption produces more conservative 
salt exposure estimates in comparison to our main data-driven 
scenarios.
We estimated the additional number of CVD and GCa cases 
and deaths under the RD scenario between 2011 and 2025 among 
English adults aged 30–84 years by age group, sex and quin-
tile group of Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). Taking into 
account time lags between exposure and disease, IMPACTNCD 
accumulates cases and deaths up to 2035. To maximise policy 
relevance we report our results up to 2025 and based on the 
time of exposure, rather than when the event occurred. To sepa-
rate estimates into those which have already occurred and those 
which may occur if the policy is not changed, we present esti-
mates for 2011–2018 and 2019–2025 separately. We summarise 
the output distributions by reporting medians and interquartile 
ranges (IQRs) in the form of first and third quartiles. We also 
report the computed probability (Ps) that the RD is superior to 
the counterfactual scenario.
We estimated healthcare costs and workplace productivity 
losses from CVD and GCa based on published estimates from the 
UK and Ireland. CVD tariff costs varied by first year since diag-
nosis, subsequent years and year of death. Stroke costs included 
rehabilitation but not ongoing social care costs. We weighted 
healthcare costs by deprivation as there is good evidence that 
costs for the same disease show a social gradient.15 We inflated 
all costs to 2018 using UK Treasury GDP inflator tables from 
April 2018 and used an annual discount rate of 3.5%.
resulTs
In 2000/1, mean salt intake was 10.5 grams/day (95% CI: 10.1 
to 11.0) in men and 8.0 grams/day (95% CI: 7.7 to 8.3) in 
women (figure 1). Between 2003 and 2010, mean salt intake 
was reducing annually by 0.20 (95% CI: 0.12 to 0.29, P for 
trend <0.001) g/d among men and by 0.12 (95% CI: 0.06 to 
0.18, P for trend <0.001) g/d among women (table 2). From 
2011 to 2014, after the RD was implemented, annual reduc-
tions in salt intake were reduced: 0.11 (95% CI: 0.06 to 0.15, 
P for difference to pre-RD trend <0.001) g/d among men and 
0.07 (95% CI: 0.04 to 0.11, P for difference to pre-RD trend 
<0.001) g/d among women.
Including data from the NDNS Rolling Programme in a sensi-
tivity analysis did not substantially change these results.
health impacts
IMPACTNCD estimated that the slower fall in salt consump-
tion may have generated approximately 9900 (IQR: 6700 to 
13,000, Ps=2%) additional cases of CVD and approximately 
710 (IQR: −510 to 2300) CVD deaths, between 2011 and 
2018 in England (table 3). Likewise, approximately 1500 
(IQR: 510 to 2300, Ps=16%) additional cases of GCa and 610 
(IQR: −310 to 1500) additional GCa deaths between 2011 
and 2018.
If the RD continues unchanged from 2019 to 2025, the 
model estimated approximately 26 000 (IQR: 20 000 to 
31,000, Ps=0.2%) additional cases of CVD and some 5500 
(IQR: 2800 to 8500) CVD deaths, plus approximately 3800 
(IQR: 2200 to 5300, Ps=5%) additional cases of GCa.
equity impacts
Estimated cases linked to the RD were greater in the more 
deprived areas than more affluent areas (table 4). For the first 
period (2011–2018), approximately 1600 (IQR: −200 to 
3600) additional CVD cases may have occurred in the most 
affluent areas (QIMD 1) compared with approximately 2000 
(IQR: 200 to 4000) additional cases in the most deprived areas 
(QIMD 5). The model estimated approximately 1200 (IQR: 
−150 to 2700) new CVD cases in QIMD 1 vs 1500 (IQR: 150 
to 2800) in QIMD 5 per 100,000 CVD cases.
economic impacts
We estimated the incremental economic impact of the RD to 
date (2011–2018) as approximately £160 million (IQR: £88 to 
£230 million, Ps=6.6%) (table 5). This includes approximately 
£110 million (IQR: £61 to £160 million) in additional health-
care costs and some £47 million (IQR: £12 to £80 million) 
in workplace productivity losses through people of working 
age living with CVD and people dying of CVD or GCa. For 
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Table 2 Interrupted time series results of salt intake (grams/day) 
2000/01–2014 pre- and post-Responsibility Deal implementation
Men Coefficient 95% CI P-value
Intercept 11.07 10.43 11.7 <0.001
Change in salt intake per year (annual 
time effect)
−0.20 −0.29 −0.12 <0.001
Slope change after the Responsibility 
Deal (time*intervention interaction)
0.09 0.03 0.17 0.004
Post-Responsibility Deal annual trend −0.11 −0.15 −0.06 <0.001
Women
Intercept 8.75 8.30 9.19 <0.001
Change in salt intake per year (annual 
time effect)
−0.12 −0.18 −0.06 <0.001
Slope change after the Responsibility 
Deal (time*intervention interaction)
0.05 0.01 0.09 0.031
Post-Responsibility Deal annual trend −0.07 −0.10 −0.04 <0.001
Sensitivity analysis
Men Coefficient 95% CI P- value
Intercept 10.98 10.4 11.57 <0.001
Change in salt intake per year (annual 
time effect)
−0.16 −0.24 −0.09 <0.001
Slope change after the Responsibility 
Deal (time*intervention interaction)
0.06 0.01 0.12 0.032
Post-Responsibility Deal annual trend −0.10 −0.15 −0.06 <0.001
Women
Intercept 8.63 8.22 9.04 <0.001
Change in salt intake per year (annual 
time effect)
−0.11 −0.17 −0.06 <0.001
Slope change after the Responsibility 
Deal (time*intervention interaction)
0.04 0.00 0.08 0.036
Post-Responsibility Deal annual trend −0.07 −0.10 −0.04 <0.001
CI, confidence Interval.
Table 3 IMPACTNCD estimates of additional cardiovascular disease (CVD) and gastric cancer cases linked to Responsibility Deal 2011–2025. 
Negative values in the lower bound of the interquartile ranges (IQR) are a consequence of stochastic noise in the model
disease Period of exposure Absolute number of additional cases (IQr) Absolute number of additional deaths (IQr)
Probability of 
superiority *
CVD
2011–2018 9900 (6700 to 13,000) 710 (-510 to 2300) 2.0%
2019–2025 26 000 (20 000 to 31,000) 5500 (2800 to 8500) 0.2%
2011–2025 35 000 (29 000 to 42,000) 6400 (3200 to 9400) <0.1%
GCa
2011–2018 1500 (510 to 2300) 610 (-310 to 1500) 16.0%
2019–2025 3800 (2200 to 5300) 1900 (790 to 3100) 5.3%
2011–2025 5300 (3400 to 7200) 2500 (920 to 3900) 5.8%
Numbers are rounded to the second significant digit.
*Probability of superiority represents the probability that the Responsibility Deal scenario had fewer cases than the counterfactual scenario.
GCa, gastric cancer.
2019–2025 the model estimated the additional incremental 
economic impact of continuing the RD to be approximately 
£970 million (IQR: £760 to £1200 million, Ps=0.1%).
one-way sensitivity analyses
In sensitivity analyses for the period 2011–2018, IMPACTNCD 
estimated that the RD may have generated 6100 (IQR: 2700 
to 9500, Ps=9.8%) additional CVD cases and 1000 (IQR: 
100 to 1800, Ps=24%) additional GCa cases. IMPACTNCD 
estimated the total incremental cost for this period may have 
been approximately £100 million (IQR: £28 to £170 million, 
Ps=17%). For 2019–2025, the model estimated that RD may 
cause 14 000 (IQR: 8600 to 19,000, Ps=3.0%) additional 
CVD cases and 2100 (IQR: 920 to 3200, Ps=12%) additional 
GCa cases. The socioeconomic gradient remained although 
was reduced in comparison with our main analysis.
dIsCussIon
Key findings
Previous reductions in population-level salt intake in England 
slowed significantly after implementation of the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal in 2011. We suggest that this slowing was 
associated with approximately 10 000 additional cases of CVD 
and 1500 cases of GCa to date (2011–2018), with an addi-
tional 26 000 cases of CVD and 3800 cases of GCa projected 
if this policy is continued until 2025. Modelled health impacts 
were larger among more deprived populations, thus poten-
tially widening inequalities and the associated healthcare and 
productivity costs exceeded £1 billion.
strengths and limitations
This is the first study to estimate the impact of the RD on 
population-level salt intake, health and economic outcomes, 
building on the foundations laid by MacGregor et al.6 Esti-
mates of salt intake are derived from 24 hours' urine excretion 
verified using para-aminobenzoic acid (PABA) which is the 
'gold standard' for population-level monitoring.16 Our find-
ings are informed by an ITS which is in line with best practice 
in answering questions about population- level interventions 
and effects.13
There are nonetheless limitations, including a lack of longi-
tudinal data collections on salt intakes in the same people, 
meaning that we cannot ascribe causality to the RD. The cost 
and burden of undertaking 24 hours' urine collections means 
that data come from a small number of participants in some 
years and the relatively low number of data points included 
only two post-RD in our main analyses . However, sensitivity 
analyses with additional data points from the NDNS Rolling 
Programme produced consistent findings. Our modelling 
assumed that persons≥64 years would have similar trends in 
salt intake to those found in spot urine data from the HSE.17 
The 24-hour sodium surveys had limited information on the 
socioeconomic position of participants and so we used spot 
urine data from the HSE to estimate socioeconomic gradient 
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Table 4 IMPACTNCD estimates of additional cardiovascular disease (CVD) and gastric cancer cases linked to Responsibility Deal 2011–2025 by 
deprivation group. Negative values in the lower bound of the interquartile ranges (IQR) are a consequence of stochastic noise in the model
disease QIMd (5=most deprived) Absolute number of additional cases (IQr) rate per 100 000 person-years (IQr)
rate per 100 000 new 
cases
2011–2018 *
CVD 1 1600 (-200 to 3600) 3.0 (-0.38 to 6.7) 1200 (-150 to 2700)
2 1900 (200 to 4100) 3.6 (0.38 to 7.5) 1300 (130 to 2700)
3 1900 (100 to 4100) 3.6 (0.19 to 7.5) 1300 (65 to 2800)
4 2000 (2800 to 4100) 3.9 (0.52 to 7.7) 1500 (200 to 2900)
5 2000 (200 to 4000) 4.1 (0.4 to 7.8) 1500 (150 to 2800)
GCa 1 200 (-310 to 820) 0.37 (-0.75 to 1.5) 910 (-4,400 to 5400)
2 310 (-310 to 920) 0.56 (-0.56 to 1.7) 1000 (-4,000 to 6100)
3 310 (-310 to 820) 0.57 (-0.56 to 1.5) 420 (-3,500 to 5900)
4 410 (-200 to 940) 0.76 (-0.39 to 1.8) 1300 (-4,100 to 6800)
5 310 (-200 to 920) 0.59 (-0.39 to 1.7) 1200 (-4,200 to 7100)
2019–2025 *
CVD 1 4300 (1400 to 7100) 9.1 (2.9 to 15) 3600 (1100 to 6100)
2 5100 (2000 to 8300) 11 (4.3 to 17) 4100 (1600 to 6600)
3 5300 (1900 to 8400) 11 (4.1 to 18) 4200 (1500 to 6600)
4 5400 (2200 to 8700) 11 (4.7 to 18) 4500 (1800 to 7100)
5 5800 (2300 to 9100) 12 (5.1 to 19) 4500 (1900 to 7100)
GCa 1 710 (0 to 1300) 1.5 (0 to 2.8) 7100 (-1,600 to 17,000)
2 820 (0 to 1500) 1.7 (0 to 3.3) 7800 (-930 to 20,000)
3 820 (0 to 1500) 1.7 (0.42 to 3.3) 9000 (-1,200 to 20,000)
4 820 (0 to 1500) 1.7 (0 to 3.2) 10 000 (-1,300 to 21,000)
5 820 (0 to 1500) 1.7 (0 to 3.2) 9200 (-1,500 to 22,000)
Numbers are rounded to the second significant digit.
*Years refer to the years in which the relevant policies were in operation, although outcomes can be accumulated up to 2035.
GCa, gastric cancer; QIMD, Quantile group of Index of Multiple Deprivation.
in salt intake (see online supplementary appendix p9-12 for 
additional details). This approach assumed that the transi-
tion from the FSA strategy to the RD did not alter the equity 
impacts of reformulation activities, although this assumption 
is nonetheless consistent with other empirical evidence.18
Our counterfactual scenario assumed that the ongoing linear 
decline in salt intake observed during the period of the FSA 
scheme continues linearly beyond 2010. To address uncer-
tainty around this assumption we undertook a one-way sensi-
tivity analysis that assumed logarithmic decline of mean salt 
intake and these findings concur with our main analyses. It 
is possible that we may have underestimated the attenuation 
of the decline in salt intake from the RD as it is likely that 
reformulation activities planned as part of the FSA strategy 
would not have stopped immediately.Finally, the estimates of 
disease costs presented here were based on workplace produc-
tivity costs, and not other costs including the economic value 
of quality adjusted life years, so this study likely represents 
a conservative estimate of the true economic impact of the 
RD. Nonetheless, if we examined total societal costs then it is 
possible the net monetary benefits may be negative if many of 
the life years gained are in older age groups, when many people 
have moved from being net producers to net consumers.
Comparison with other research
Salt reduction strategies are generally implemented nationally 
and few countries routinely collect representative 24 hours' 
urine data with sufficient frequency to assess policy impacts. 
Emerging data from country case studies, including from South 
Africa and Brazil, suggest that interventions of a structural 
nature, such as reformulation or food procurement policies, 
are most effective at reducing population-level salt intake.19 20 
This is confirmed by findings from a recent systematic review 
which indicated that whole-population interventions have 
the potential to substantially reduce salt intake, particularly 
if they are multi-component.21 However, there remains very 
little evaluation of different models of industry engagement 
and whether regulatory approaches are more effective than 
voluntary targets, which is an important evidence gap as that 
the majority of countries with targets for salt reduction have 
voluntary rather than mandatory targets.22
Proponents of the RD argued that the increased role of 
industry would deliver more effective action to reduce salt 
intakes at lower cost than the FSA strategy,4 but our findings 
suggest this not to be the case. The design and implementa-
tion of the RD has been criticised for being underpinned by 
pledges made by the food industry, not following evidence of 
effectiveness to improve diets.5 While 46% of food industry 
salt reduction pledges did include reformulation of their 
products by 2013, independent evaluation concluded that 
none of these measures were prompted by the RD.23 24 Our 
findings that population levels of salt intake were decreasing 
until 2010 but then attenuated are consistent with official 
analyses and predictions by MacGregor et al.6 12 25 26 Our find-
ings suggest that the RD may have had a particularly negative 
impact among more deprived populations, consistent with 
other research on the hierarchy of effectiveness in nutritional 
interventions.18 21 27 28
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Table 5 Incremental healthcare and workplace productivity costs 
in the Responsibility Deal scenario compared with the counterfactual 
scenario. costs in 2018 GBP
disease
healthcare costs 
in million (IQr)
Workplace 
productivity costs 
in million (IQr) Total
2011–2018 *
CVD £83 (£50 to £120) £37 (£13 to £61)
Gastric cancer £30 (-£6.4 to £66) £8.4 (-£16 to £34)
Total 2011–2018 £110 (£61 to 
£160)
£47 (£12 to £80) £160 (£88 to 230)
2019–2025 *
CVD £500 (£380 to 
£620)
£290 (£170 to 
£400)
Gastric cancer £150 (£68 to 
£220)
£27 (-£8.0 to £61)
Total 2019–2025 £650 (£450 to 
£840)
£320 (£162 to 460) £970 (£760 to 
£1,200)
Combined costs 
2011–2025 *
CVD £583 (£430 to 
£740)
£327 (£183 to 
£461)
Gastric cancer £180 (£61 to 
£286)
£35.4 (-£24 to £95)
Negative values in the lower bound of the interquartile ranges are a consequence of 
stochastic noise in the model.
Numbers are rounded to the second significant digit.
*Years refer to the years in which the relevant policies were in operation, although 
outcomes can be accumulated up to 2035.
CVD, cardiovascular disease; IQR, interquartile range.
What is already known on this subject
 ► Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as 
a key mechanism to improve population health, including 
addressing dietary risk factors for non-communicable disease
 ► Salt intake is a leading risk factor for both cardiovascular 
disease and gastric cancer
 ► Between 2003 and 2010, the United Kingdom had an 
internationally recognised scheme to reduce population-level 
salt intake, led by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and 
backed by governmental threat of mandatory imposition in 
the event of poor industry compliance. This was replaced by a 
different PPP known as the Public Health Responsibility Deal 
(RD) in England in 2011.
What this study adds
 ► Using individual-level data from 24 hours' urine samples 
we estimated that reductions in salt intake during the FSA 
scheme slowed significantly after introduction of the RD.
 ► Using a microsimulation model, we estimate that transition 
from the FSA scheme to the RD may have generated 
approximately 9900 cases of CVD and 1500 cases of GCa 
between 2011 and 2018. If the RD continues unchanged 
through to 2025 we estimate an additional 26 000 cases 
of CVD and 3800 cases of GCa. These impacts were 
proportionally greater among more disadvantaged groups 
which may widen health inequalities. Associated excess 
healthcare and societal costs exceed £1 billion during the 
period 2011–2025.
 ► Without independent targets and monitoring, PPPs are 
unlikely to deliver the improvements in population health 
claimed by their proponents.
Policy implications
There is renewed policy interest in identifying and imple-
menting optimal strategies to reduce population-level salt 
intake, and England is due to soon publish a new salt reduction 
strategy.29 Food industry engagement in such strategies is vitally 
important to optimise health and economic benefits, especially 
in high- income countries where the majority of dietary salt 
comes from processed and ultra-processed foods.30 Our find-
ings suggest that if PPPs are used they require independent 
setting of targets, robust monitoring, and the use of incentives 
and tough sanctions to ensure compliance as highlighted by 
recent studies.2 Furthermore, the standard UK government 
approach to regulation is to try voluntary measures and legis-
late only if these fail.31 The shift from a semi-regulated volun-
tary agreement to a looser agreement (from the FSA to RD) 
could thus be viewed as a retrograde political move. Public 
Health England plans to review the future of the salt reduction 
programme very soon and we hope that this will consider the 
earlier FSA successes and evidence favouring a robust policy 
approach.
ConClusIons
Our findings suggest that declines in salt intake slowed after 
implementation of the Public Health Responsibility Deal in 
England, resulting in excess CVD and cancer burdens, plus 
additional healthcare and societal costs. Public-private part-
nerships such as the RD which lack robust and independent 
target setting, monitoring and enforcement, are unlikely to 
produce optimal health gains.
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